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LIBERTY, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND
THE RULE OF LAW AT
GUANTANAMO:
A BATTLE HALF WON
DOUGLASS CASSEL*
Abstract: In Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), five members of
the Supreme Court held that foreign prisoners at Guantanamo enjoy the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus; that their imprisonment had lasted
too long for the Court to await completion of statutory review by lower
courts of military tribunal findings that the prisoners were "enemy
combatants"; and that the statutory judicial review was too deficient to
substitute for the Great Writ.
Four Justices vigorously dissented. On the surface they differed on the
history of the reach of the common law writ of habeas corpus, and on the
procedural guarantees afforded by habeas, as compared to the new statutory
procedures for judicial review.
More fundamentally, the controlling differences were on questions of
constitutional priorities and separation of powers. In assessing judicial
review of prolonged detentions at Guantanamo, which constitutional value
matters more-liberty or security? Which is more at risk? And which
branch-the judicial or one of the political branches-is more suited to
making these judgments?
In assuring prisoners at Guantanamo access to habeas corpus, the majority
extended a series of rulings in which the Court has defended individual
liberty, judicial review of executive detentions, and ultimately the rule of
law, against encroachments by an overzealous executive, joined in some
cases by compliant congressional majorities.
But the battle is only half won. The majority left open critical substantive
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law
School.
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and procedural questions. For example: Is there any lawful basis for
indefinite detention of persons captured outside traditional war zones? What
is the government's burden of proof in a habeas case from Guantanamo?
How should the courts handle hearsay, classified evidence, and evidence
obtained by coercive means?
Although lower courts have subsequently begun to grapple with these
questions, definitive answers may depend on the future composition of the
Court-unless President-elect Obama fulfills his stated intention to close the
prison at Guantanamo, in which event the issues may become moot, and this
offense against the rule of law brought finally to an end.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court ruling in Boumediene v. Bush' is the latest in a
quartet of judgments in the last four years in which narrow Supreme Court
majorities have defended individual liberty, judicial review of executive
detentions, and ultimately the rule of law, against encroachments by an
overzealous executive and, in the two most recent cases, by compliant
congressional majorities as well.
In Boumediene, a bare majority of the Court ruled that foreign
prisoners detained as unlawful "enemy combatants" at the U.S. Naval Base
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have a constitutional right to seek habeas
corpus relief.2 The majority further held that the truncated judicial review
invented by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA") 3 for prisoners at
Guantanamo is not an "adequate and effective" substitute for the Great
Writ.
I. The Road to Boumediene
To appreciate the cumulative value of the successive stands now
taken by the Court, one must recall the starting point. Before the Court first
1. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2. Id. at 2240. Tracking the language of the Constitution, the Court's judgment refers
to the "[p]rivilege" of habeas corpus. Id. But this privilege is clearly the functional
equivalent of a right; the majority found the judicial review provision of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 to be unconstitutional, precisely because it purported to take
away habeas without providing an adequate substitute. Id. The majority mused, "[t]he word
'privilege' was used [in the Constitution], perhaps, to avoid mentioning some rights to the
exclusion of others." Id. at 2246.
3. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739,
2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (Supp. V 2006)).
4. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
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ruled in 2004 in Rasul v. Bush,5 the stance of the Executive branch was
breathtakingly lawless. The President asserted the right, on the basis of
secret intelligence information, to imprison foreign citizens at Guantanamo
indefinitely and to hold them until the "war on terrorism" is over-
whenever that may be-without charging them with any offense, and
without their ever having access to lawyers or courts.6 In other words, the
President said, in effect, "Trust me to imprison human beings, potentially
for life, with no judicial review."
This, in turn, reflected the Executive position that no U.S. law-no
safeguard of the Constitution, no statute and no treaty-conferred any
rights on the prisoners at Guantanamo. 7 And since no Cuban law reached
the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo either, the effect of the Executive's
legal theory was, as one British Court acidly observed, to convert
Guantanamo into a "legal black hole." 8
Suspected enemy combatants were first sent to Guantanamo in
January 2002. After some had been imprisoned there for two and a half
years, the Court decided Rasul. By a 6-3 majority, the Court interpreted the
federal habeas corpus statute, in light of the history of habeas at British
common law, to extend habeas jurisdiction to foreign citizens held in a
territory, specifically Guantanamo, "over which the United States exercises
plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not 'ultimate sovereignty.'
9
At the same time the Court addressed the rights of U.S. citizens held
as enemy combatants in the U.S. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1° eight Justices
rejected the Executive claim of power to subject Americans to the same
treatment it inflicted on foreigners at Guantanamo-to imprison them
indefinitely as enemy combatants, with no hearings, no charges and no
lawyers.
But the Justices could not agree on a majority opinion. A four-Justice
plurality held that the President had lawful authority to detain indefinitely
U.S. citizens captured in connection with hostilities in Afghanistan, but
5. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
6. See id. at 483 n.15.
7. Before the district court in 2002, the government argued that the only applicable law
was international law. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2002). Before the
Supreme Court in 2004, the government acknowledged that the President had determined in
2002 that the Geneva Conventions do not protect Al Qaeda or Taliban prisoners at
Guantanamo. See Brief for the Respondents at 20-21, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(Nos. 03-334 and 03-343).
8. R. v. Secretary of State, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, [22] [107] (Eng.), available at
2002 WL 31452052.
9. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475, 483-84 (quoting 1903 Lease Agreement, Art. II|).
10. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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only pursuant to constitutionally mandated procedures.1 ' They held that due
process requires, at minimum, that a citizen detainee "must receive notice
of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."'
' 2
Four justices denied the premise: In their view, the President had no
authority to detain U.S. citizens indefinitely as enemy combatants.
3
Justices Scalia and Stevens held this view on constitutional grounds. 14 The
Constitution, they argued in dissent, bars indefinite detention in U.S.
territory of U.S. citizens not charged with crimes, unless Congress
suspends the right of habeas corpus, which it had not done.1
5
Justices Souter and Ginsburg disputed the President's authority to
detain on statutory grounds: They believed that Congress had not only
failed to authorize, but had in fact prohibited such detentions.1
6
Nonetheless, they reluctantly concurred in the plurality judgment, solely in
order to create a majority result that would at least require a remand for the
due process protections required by the plurality.'
7
The Pentagon responded to Rasul and Hamdi by establishing
Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRTs"): panels of military officers
who afford detainees at Guantanamo hearings to determine whether they
are "enemy combatants."' 8 Despite numerous procedural shortcomings, 9
the military contended that CSRTs satisfied even the due process standards
for U.S. citizens set forth by the plurality in Hamdi. In other words, CSRTs
supposedly provide a "meaningful" opportunity for detainees to contest the
"factual basis" for detention before a "neutral" decisionmaker.2°
Once these new administrative procedures were in place, Congress in
2005 passed the DTA, which revised the statutory procedures for judicial
review. Attempting to nullify Rasul, Congress amended the habeas statute
11. Id.
12. Id. at 533.
13. Id. at 554, 573, 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540, 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in judgment). They found Hamdi's detention forbidden by the Non-
Detention Act and not authorized by any act of Congress, including the congressional
resolution authorizing the use of force after the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Id. at 553.
The Non-Detention Act provides, "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by
the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
17. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553-54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
18. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241, 2269-70 (2008).
19. See infra Part II.B.2.
20. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
[Vol. 43:37
A BATTLE HALF WON
to exclude jurisdiction over foreign detainees at Guantanamo. 2 It offered
them instead a limited form of judicial review of the determinations of
CSRTs.2 2
In 2006, a 5-4 majority of the Court-the Rasul majority, minus the
now departed Justice Sandra Day O'Connor--decided Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.2 3 The now reduced majority interpreted the provision of the
DTA denying habeas not to apply to cases pending when the DTA was
passed.
On the eve of the 2006 elections, Congress responded to this ruling by
passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA").24 Among other
provisions, the MCA purported to deny habeas to all Guantanamo prisoners
who then had pending habeas petitions.25 This set the stage for
Boumediene.
DISCUSSION
II. Showdown at Boumediene
The main issues on the merits in Boumediene were constitutional.2 6
First, does the Constitution afford foreign prisoners at Guantanamo a right
to habeas corpus?27 If so, that right cannot be withdrawn, except pursuant
to the Suspension Clause, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution,
which provides, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."'28 No one contended that the MCA suspended habeas.
The second constitutional question, which then arose only if the Court
ruled that the right of habeas indeed extends to prisoners at Guantanamo,
21. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739,
2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (Supp. V 2006)). DTA § 1005(e)(1)
provides that "no court ... shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... an application for.
habeas corpus filed by... an alien detained.., at Guantanamo Bay ..." Id.
22. See infra Part II.B.2.
23. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined fully by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, and in part by Justice Kennedy, concurring. Id. at 564.
24. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007).
26. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008). The Court also ruled, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 denied federal
courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions by prisoners at Guantanamo which were
pending at the time it was enacted. Id. at 2242.
27. Although the Suspension Clause refers to the "[p]rivilege" of habeas corpus, the
Court treated this as synonymous with a "right." See supra note 2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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was whether the alternative DTA judicial review is an adequate substitute
for habeas.29
There was also a preliminary, prudential issue: Should the Court
refrain from deciding these constitutional issues? The first judicial reviews
of CSRT findings under the DTA were pending before the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 30 Under doctrines of
exhaustion of statutory remedies, and avoidance of unnecessary
constitutional issues, the Court would not ordinarily hear a habeas petition
while statutory procedures below were pending.3' Should it do so now?
A five-member majority of the Court-the same five who decided
Hamdan (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter and Stevens)-
answered all three questions in favor of the petitioning prisoners. They held
that the prisoners, some of whom had been imprisoned for six years
without a final judicial determination, had waited too long for the Court to
defer hearing the case any longer.32 They ruled that the constitutional right
to habeas, at least, extends to foreign citizens detained at Guantanamo,
where the U.S. has de facto, if not de jure, sovereignty. 33 And they decided
that the combination of CSRTs and limited judicial review under the DTA
were not adequate substitutes for habeas.34
The dissenters took opposing views on all three questions. In a dissent
authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Scalia and
Thomas, they argued that the majority was precipitous in bypassing the
proceedings below and reaching the constitutional questions, 35 and further
that DTA judicial review is, in any event, an adequate substitute for
habeas.36 In a separate dissent written by Justice Scalia and joined by the
other three Justices, they argued that foreign citizens at Guantanamo have
no constitutional right to habeas.3 7
Both sides offered lengthy analyses of the historical reach of habeas,
as well as detailed assessments of the CSRT and DTA review procedures,
29. Boutnediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2243-44.
30. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (citing Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834
(D.C. Cir. 2008) and Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see Bismullah v.
Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g denied, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g en
banc denied, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
31. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479 (2007) (statement of Stevens and
Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari).
32. Bounediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
33. Id. at 2253.
34. Id. at 2272.
35. Id. at 2280-81 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2280.
37. Id. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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which shaped their views on whether the Court should reach the
constitutional questions or, instead, await the outcome of the pending DTA
judicial review in the court of appeals.
A. The Real Fault Lines
The fundamental, and probably controlling, differences between the
two sides were on questions of constitutional priorities and separation of
powers. In assessing judicial review of detentions at Guantanamo, which
constitutional value matters more-liberty or security? Which is more at
risk? And which branch is most appropriate to make this judgment-the
judicial branch, traditional guardian of individual liberty, or the political
branches, with their greater expertise and constitutional responsibility to
defend national security?
These are the real fault lines that divided the majority and dissent in
Boumediene, far more than their differing historical and procedural
assessments. And these fault lines are likely to determine future cases. With
one member of the majority now 88 years old,38 and others rumored to be
ready to retire soon, the constitutional philosophies of the next
appointments to the Court may be decisive for the important questions left
undecided by Boumediene. Among them are the scope and standard of
habeas review of factual determinations made by CSRTs, and whether
there is any lawful basis for detentions at Guantanamo of persons (like Mr.
Boumediene) captured outside traditional war zones.39
1. Liberty and Security
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy was clear on priorities and
trade-offs among constitutional values. The Framers, he began, "viewed
freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty, and
they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure
that freedom. ' '40 That was why habeas was "one of the few safeguards of
liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of
Rights."4'
Security matters too. But the government, wrote Justice Kennedy,
advanced "no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo
would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the
38. Justice Stevens was born April 20, 1920. The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
39. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271, 2277. Some petitioners in Boumediene were
apprehended, not on the battlefield in Afghanistan, but "in places as far away from there as
Bosnia and Gambia." Id. at 2241; see infra Part I.B.
40. Id. at 2244.
41. Id.
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detainees' claims. And in light of the plenary control the United States
asserts over the base, none are apparent to us. ' '42 The detainees were
"contained in a secure prison facility located on an isolated and heavily
fortified military base,, 43 far from any "active theater of war.
' ' 4
Security, he acknowledged, requires sophisticated intelligence and a
capable military.45 But security depends on more: "Security subsists, too, in
fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom from
arbitrary and unlawful restraint.... ,A6 In short: "The laws and
Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary
times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are
reconciled within the framework of the law."47
In dissent, Justice Scalia began by warning of the "disastrous
consequences" of the majority ruling.48 "America is at war with radical
Islamists," he reminded.49 Providing habeas review to prisoners at
Guantanamo, he predicted, "will make the war harder on us. It will almost
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.
50
Why? First, he argued, habeas review would set free increasing
numbers of enemy combatants who will return to battle. Some thirty
prisoners previously released by the military had already returned to fight,
in some cases killing civilians and Afghan soldiers.1 If habeas sets the
evidentiary bar higher in order to justify continued detention, he projected,
the number of enemy fighters returned to combat "will obviously
increase.,
52
Second, information released "to the attorneys representing our
enemies" in a habeas trial, as in earlier criminal trials, could compromise
national security.
53
The dissenters' concerns are legitimate. But they overlook larger
security issues. Does the worldwide condemnation of indefinite detentions
at Guantanamo undermine our national security? Does it deter allies from
cooperating with us in apprehending suspected terrorists and in sharing
42. Id. at 2261.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2262.
45. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2294-95.
52. Id. at 2295.
53. Id.
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intelligence? Does it enrage Muslims worldwide, generating far more new
recruits for the "radical Islamists" than any plausible number of enemy
combatants likely to be set free by habeas? Does restoring habeas for
Guantanamo prisoners send a healthy signal to the world that we are who
we say we are-defenders of liberty and the rule of law? Will rulings like
those in Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan and now Boumediene, preserve at least
some of our honor and standing among allies whose assistance we need?
Will these rulings ultimately make our model-the rule of law, enforced by
independent courts-more attractive in the global contest for hearts and
minds than a model of extremist theocracy?
Justice Scalia's alarm bell also suffers from mundane methodological
cracks. The Pentagon has already released most prisoners from
Guantanamo to other governments.54 Some were then set free. It is likely
that the prisoners who remain are, in general, detainees for whom the
evidence is stronger that they should be kept in detention, because they are
too dangerous.55 If so, then it is not at all "obvious" that granting them
habeas review will lead to a high-let alone to a higher-release rate.
A second category of prisoners who remain at Guantanamo are not
even enemy combatants, but simply have no other eligible government
willing to receive them. Because the government concedes that seventeen
Chinese Uighurs held at Guantanamo are not enemy combatants, but they
cannot be returned to China where they risk being tortured, and no other
government is yet willing to take them, a federal judge in October 2008
ordered that they be released into the U.S. 56 After the government argued
that the men were trained for armed insurrection against China, the court of
appeals stayed the Order pending appeal.57 The government now argues
that a U.S. judge has no authority to order their release from Guantanamo
into the U.S.58 Yet the fact remains: not even the government contends that
these prisoners are "enemy combatants."
54. See U.S. Dep't of Def., News Release No. 736-08, Sept. 2, 2008, http://www.
defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD=12174. "Since 2002, more than 500
detainees have departed Guantanamo, and approximately 255 remain." Id. (emphasis
added).
55. This likelihood is by no means a certainty. On remand the district court in
Boumediene ruled that the government failed to meet its burden to justify continued
detention of five of the six prisoners in that case. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191,
197-99 (D.D.C. 2008).
56. In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, No. 05-1509, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79238, at
*8-9, *12, *20 & n.2, *35 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2008).
57. Warren Richey, Showdown Ahead Over 17 Uighur Detainees, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2008, at 2.
58. Warren Richey, Can U.S. Judges Order Detainees Released?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 25, 2008, at 25.
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2. Separation of Powers
A related fault line separating the majority from the dissent has to do
with the proper conception of separation of powers. "In considering both
the procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to
prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political
branches," Justice Kennedy recognized for the majority.5 9 "The law must
accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those
who pose a real danger to our security." 60 But, he added, "[w]ithin the
Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial
power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear
challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.
' 61
Some prisoners had been at Guantanamo "for six years with no
definitive judicial determination. 6 2 Their access to habeas was now a
"necessity" in order to determine whether they were lawftilly held, "even if,
in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek.,
63
Justice Kennedy thus invoked the traditional role of the courts as
independent guardian of the rights of unpopular individuals and minorities
who often cannot expect adequate protection from the majoritarian
branches.64
In contrast, Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion focused on the
role of courts, not so much as guardians of individual rights, but as
meddlers in foreign policy. He lamented that the American people "today
lose a bit more control over the conduct of this Nation's foreign policy to
unelected, politically unaccountable judges."65
Justice Scalia was more concerned about the majority's poking its
nose into military matters. Dismissing Justice Kennedy's conclusion that
allowing habeas at Guantanamo would not harm the military mission,
Justice Scalia asked and answered, "What competence does the Court have
to second-guess the judgment of Congress and the President on such a
point? None whatever.9
66
59. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008).
60. Id. at 2276-77.
61. Id. at 2277.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. In an oft-cited dictum in US. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), the Court acknowledged that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
65. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Despite these differing perspectives, there is significant common
ground. No one questions that the Constitution assigns the political
branches, not the Judiciary, primary responsibility for national security.
Likewise few doubt that the Judiciary has a duty to protect the rights of
unpopular individuals and groups-and who is more unpopular than
suspected terrorists?-from the majoritarian branches.
The dispute is over the relative importance of these roles in the
context of detentions at Guantanamo. In discounting any serious security
threat posed by extending habeas to Guantanamo, the majority relied not so
much on its own judgment, as on the fact that the Executive put forward
"no credible arguments" of any threat to security. 67 Surely if there were
such a threat, the Executive had both a duty and the expertise to bring it
forcefully to the Court's attention.
If the threat to security was slight, in the majority's view, the threat to
liberty was grave: some detainees had been imprisoned for six years with
no final ruling on their status. Moreover, the DTA review procedures were
not likely to lead to reliable determinations of their status.68
For the majority, then, the security argument was weak, the liberty
argument strong. In order to adjust the balance, Justice Scalia outdid the
Executive in predicting a security threat, while Justice Roberts downplayed
the threat to liberty, by focusing on the formalities-but not the realities-
of DTA judicial review. 69 Their arguments suggest a general inclination to
give more weight to security, and less to liberty (at least for foreign
citizens), 70 than would the majority. They also reflect a general view that
courts should defer to the political branches, even when liberty is at stake,
at least in cases involving foreign policy or national security.
But the debate over separation of powers went even further than these
familiar philosophical differences: Each side made startling accusations of
usurpation of powers. The majority warned that the Judiciary could not
allow the Constitution to be "contracted away.' In other words, the
Judiciary could not permit the Executive to surrender formal sovereignty,
while keeping "plenary control" over a territory like Guantanamo, and
thereby to enable "the political branches to govern without legal
67. Id. at 2261 (majority opinion).
68. See infra Part II.B.2.
69. See infra Part I.B.2.
70. Justice Scalia's opinion defends habeas jurisdiction over U.S. detentions of U.S.
citizens abroad, but not over U.S. detentions of aliens, who, he explains, are not part of a
"system in which rule is derived from the consent of the governed, and in which citizens
(not 'subjects') are afforded defined protections against the Government." Boumediene, 128
S. Ct. at 2306.
71. Id. at 2259 (majority opinion).
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constraint.
' 72
If this is true of the Constitution generally, the majority admonished,
it is even truer of habeas corpus. The Great Writ "is itself an indispensable
mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers. The test for
determining the scope of this provision must not be subject to manipulation
by those whose power it is designed to restrain."
73
Did the majority mean to imply that the Executive maintained its
lease for Guantanamo precisely in order to hold on to a law-free zone? Or,
more modestly, that if the Court were to allow a formalistic reservation of
de jure sovereignty to knock out habeas at Guantanamo, would such a
ruling encourage the Executive to utilize formal reservations of sovereignty
to "contract away" the Constitution elsewhere too?
Either way, the suggestion of executive "manipulation" seems
extraordinary. It can probably best be understood in the context of the
events which led the Court to take the Boumediene case in the first place.74
It may also reflect the evidence, widely reported by 2008, that a belief that
federal court jurisdiction did not extend to Guantanamo was at least one
important reason why the Executive originally chose to detain post-9/11
prisoners there.75
72. Id. at 2258-59.
73. Id. at 2259.
74. See infra Part II.C.
75. Major U.S. media had long reported explanations by government officials that
Guantanamo was chosen because it is the "legal equivalent of outer space." Jess Bravin,
Guantanamo Bay Detainees Seek Hearings - Lawyers Question Holding Suspected
Terrorists Without Offering Legal Case Against Them, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002, at A4
(stating that Guantanamo was chosen over military bases on U.S. territories in the Pacific,
which are under the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit);
ABCNews.com, Detention Dilemma: Two Years After 9/11, Guantanamo Prisoners Remain
in Legal Limbo, June 25, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web/20040625184522/http://abcnews
.go.com/sections/2020/US/2020_guantanamo_040625- .html ("Guantanamo had been
chosen deliberately. It was, one official said, the 'legal equivalent of outer space."');
Michael Isikoff, Stuart Taylor & Daniel Klaidman, The Guantanamo Fallout, NEWSWEEK,
July 17, 2006, at 30-31 (citing State Department lawyer David Bowker, a member of the
Bush Administration "working group" on detainees, who recalled that "a colleague
explained the goal: to 'find the legal equivalent of outer space' - a 'lawless' universe. As
Bowker understood it, the idea was to create a system where detainees would have no legal
rights and U.S. courts would have no power to intervene.").
These recollections are supported by contemporaneous documents. On December 28, 2001,
shortly before the first detainees were transferred to Guantanamo, the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Justice Department advised the Department of Defense that "the great weight
of legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly exercise habeas
jurisdiction over an alien detained at GBC [Guantanamo Bay, Cuba]. Nonetheless, we
cannot say with absolute certainty that any such petition would be dismissed for lack of
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The dissenters responded with accusations, not of executive, but of
judicial manipulation. Justice Scalia claimed that if habeas was designed to
restrain the Executive, then the limits on habeas-which, he argued, the
majority exceeded-were "just as much 'designed to restrain' the
incursions of the Third Branch. 76
His parallelism makes for good rhetoric, but bad history. The thrust of
the historical development of habeas corpus was to check arbitrary
executive detentions. Geographic limits on the scope of habeas reflected,
not separation of judicial and executive powers, but the practical reality
that the Court could not rule where its writ could not reach, coupled with
comity toward the prerogative of foreign governments to govern in their
own territories.77 At Guantanamo, neither historical concern applies: U.S.
power controls the base without question, and no foreign government
exercises any rights that must be respected.
Justice Scalia also made a separate, functional claim: "'Manipulation'
of the territorial reach of the writ by the Judiciary poses just as much a
threat to the proper separation of powers as 'manipulation' by the
Executive. 'T In theory, this could be a valid claim. For example, if the
Judiciary were to require immediate habeas corpus review of battlefield
captures of enemy combatants in foreign lands, that would amount to
manipulation of a writ never intended to reach so far. But Justice Kennedy
was careful to rule out such imprudence. When foreign citizens are
detained abroad, he cautioned, "it likely would be both an impractical and
unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that habeas corpus
would be available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody.,
79
jurisdiction." Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Memorandum for William J. Haynes, II,
General Counsel, Department of Defense, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), available at http://www.texscience.org/reform/
torture/philbin-yoo-habeas-28dec01.pdf. Petitioners in Boumediene advised the Court: "As
John Yoo, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the time, later explained: '[N]o location
was perfect,' but Guantanamo 'seemed to fit the bill .... [T]he federal courts probably
wouldn't consider Gitmo as falling within their habeas jurisdiction."' Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 13-14, Khaled v. United States, No. 06-1196, 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS
561 (Aug. 24, 2007) (quoting JOHN YOO, WAR By OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT
OF THE WAR ON TERROR 142-43 (2006)).
76. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2297-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., id at 2250 (majority opinion) ("Common law decisions withholding the
writ from prisoners detained in these places [Scotland and the Electorate of Hanover] easily
could be explained as efforts to avoid either or both of two embarrassments: conflict with
the judgments of another court of competent jurisdiction; or the practical inability, by reason
of distance, of the English courts to enforce their judgments outside their territorial
jurisdiction.").
78. Id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2275 (majority opinion).
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Moreover, Guantanamo is no battlefield. Habeas for prisoners at
Guantanamo, albeit unprecedented, 80 is not judicial manipulation. Justice
Scalia's effort to convert the moderate Justice Kennedy into a judicial
power-grabber lacks credibility.
B. The Merits: Formalism vs. Practical Realism
In addressing both the reach of habeas jurisdiction and the adequacy
of alternative judicial review under the DTA, the majority stressed practical
realities, while the dissenters leaned on formalistic concerns.
1. Habeas Jurisdiction over Foreign Detainees at
Guantanamo
In reviewing common law precedents for habeas jurisdiction over
detentions of foreign nationals in marginal territories, as well as precedents
for extraterritorial applications of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy's
opinion was as candid as it was pragmatic. There simply is no precise
precedent. Earlier cases involve pre-Revolutionary British habeas
jurisdiction (or lack thereof) over Scotland, Ireland or the Channel Isles;
constitutional protections for American overseas territories; the rights of
spouses of American service members overseas or of Americans whose
homes are searched in other countries; and the denial of habeas review for
foreign citizens convicted after full military commission trials overseas and
held in prisons where the U.S. shared jurisdiction with other detaining
powers during World War 11.81 None of these disparate cases directly
answers the question of whether habeas jurisdiction extends over executive
detentions of foreign citizens in a territory, like Guantanamo, where the
U.S. exercises plenary, de facto jurisdiction, but not formal de jure
sovereignty.82
"In the end," concluded Justice Kennedy, "a categorical or formal
conception of sovereignty does not provide a comprehensive or altogether
satisfactory explanation" for the territorial scope of habeas at British
common law.83 Likewise the "common thread" uniting precedents on
extraterritorial application of the Constitution is "the idea that questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
80. Justice Kennedy explained: "[i]t is true that before today the Court has never held
that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country
maintains dejure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution. But the cases before
us lack any precise historical parallel." Id. at 2262.
81. Id. at 2248-51, 2253-58, 2259-62.
82. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
83. Id. at 2250.
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formalism."
84
Dismissing the practical realities underlying the precedents, Justice
Scalia's reply was unrelentingly binary: territory is either sovereign or not.
There was no precedent to exercise habeas jurisdiction over detentions of
"aliens abroad" or of foreign citizens in "foreign lands. 85
True enough, but that argument overlooks the unique character of
Guantanamo-a territory where the U.S. exercises plenary control, has
done so for more than a century, and can continue to do so for as long as it
chooses; and where the formally sovereign (Cuban) government cannot so
much as set foot. Such a place is not, in any meaningful sense, a "foreign
land."
2. Adequacy of DTA Review as a Substitute for Habeas
Corpus
Practical realities similarly informed Justice Kennedy's assessment of
DTA judicial review of CSRT findings as a substitute for habeas. Common
law habeas, he observed, was an "adaptable remedy. Its precise application
and scope changed depending upon the circumstances., 86 Above all, habeas
must afford the prisoner a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate that he
is held unlawfully. 87 The necessary scope of habeas review "depends upon
the rigor of any earlier proceedings. Where a person is detained by
executive order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a
court,. .. the need for habeas corpus is more urgent." 89 This, of course, is
precisely the situation at Guantanamo.
In evaluating the adequacy of alternative judicial review under the
DTA, explained Justice Kennedy, what matters is the "sum total of
procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and
collateral." 90 The majority opinion thus assesses the procedural protections
afforded detainees both before the CSRT and in the subsequent DTA
judicial review.
The majority identified numerous deficiencies in the CSRT
proceedings. 91 The detainee:
84. Id. at 2258.
85. Id. at 2294, 2301-02, 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2267 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 2266.
88. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2268.
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" Has limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the
government's case against him; he can call witnesses only if
"reasonably available" to Guantanamo;
* Has no assistance of counsel;
* May not be aware of the most critical allegations against him, since
he can access only the "unclassified portion" of the government's
information;
* Can be determined to be an enemy combatant on the basis of
hearsay; and
* Faces a "closed and accusatorial" process.9 2
Given these shortcomings of the CSRT process, meaningful judicial
review becomes all the more important. Yet the majority found troubling
deficiencies in the DTA judicial review as well:
93
* The court of appeals is not explicitly empowered to order release of
the detainee.
* The court of appeals is not explicitly empowered to review or
correct CSRT factual determinations, or to make findings of fact. Its
scope of review is limited to whether the CSRTs followed their own
"standards and procedures" and whether those standards and
procedures are lawful.94
* The detainee cannot present relevant exculpatory evidence that was
not made part of the record in the CSRT proceedings. Although the
court of appeals decided that the DTA allows it to order production
of all "'reasonably available information in the possession of the
U.S. Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee meets
92. Id. at 2269-70 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 2271-74.
94. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2272 (quoting Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(C)(i), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
2241(e)(1))). The majority did find one opening for factual review; one of the Pentagon
standards requires that the CSRT conclusion "'be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.., allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence."' Id.
(quoting DTA § 1005(e)(C)(i)).
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the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant,"' 9 5 even this
did not give the detainee an opportunity to present evidence
"discovered after the CSRT proceedings concluded.,
96
The majority was prepared to assume that the DTA could be
construed to cure the first two defects (release orders and review of
findings of fact), but not the third-the detainee's inability to present newly
discovered or available evidence. 97 This deficiency sufficed, by itself, to
conclude that DTA judicial review "falls short of being a constitutionally
adequate substitute" for habeas. 98 Moreover, even if this deficiency were to
be cured, the "cumulative effect" of the DTA deficiencies would still be
constitutionally fatal: the DTA could not fairly be read to cure them all,
because to do so would "come close" to reinstating the very habeas
procedure Congress sought to foreclose.
99
Denouncing the majority's procedural standards as a "bait-and-
switch,"10 0 Justice Scalia complained that the majority had upped the ante
since the 2004 Hamdi decision. There the plurality held that due process
requires that a citizen detainee "must receive notice of the factual basis for
his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."'' ° Now the majority was
requiring far more, including an opportunity to present newly discovered
evidence on review, and was requiring all this for non-citizens.
In fact, Justice Scalia was comparing apples and oranges. As the
majority pointed out, the Hamdi plurality focused on what due process
required of executive detention procedures, in a context (detention of a U.S.
citizen in the U.S.) where subsequent judicial review by means of habeas
corpus was not in question. 102 The issue in Boumediene was different: What
form of judicial review is an adequate substitute for habeas corpus? Habeas
is a writ designed to "cu[t] through all forms";10 3 its requirements in a
given case might well be stricter than the minimum allowed by due process
95. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2272 (quoting Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F. 3d 178, 180
(D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g denied, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007)), reh'g en banc denied, 514
F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2271-72.
98. Id. at 2272.
99. Id. at 2274.
100. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
102. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269.
103. Id. at 2270 (quoting Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
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of law. While the majority ruled that CSRTs coupled with DTA judicial
review were not adequate substitutes for habeas, it expressly declined to
rule on "whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process
standards."
' 10 4
Chief Justice Roberts' dissent focused on a different point: He
objected that the majority had struck down "the most generous set of
procedural protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as
enemy combatants."' °5 True, but that begs the question of what is the
proper reference point for comparison-military hearings to determine
prisoner of war status in a combat zone, or habeas corpus? As the majority
noted, the DTA procedures were not more "generous" than habeas
review;106 far from it.
The Chief Justice was also unrealistic in assessing the "generous"
procedural rights afforded detainees before CSRTs. A good example is one
he selected: "Take witness availability. What makes the majority think
witnesses will become magically available when the review procedure is
labeled 'habeas'?',
10 7
Two answers come readily to mind: Detainees in habeas proceedings,
unlike CSRT proceedings, are not denied the assistance of counsel.
Counsel, in turn, are not held essentially incommunicado on an inaccessible
island outpost. Unlike the detainee before the CSRT, counsel before a
habeas court can travel to the detainee's home country or to other distant
lands to locate and persuade exculpatory witnesses to agree to testify.
As the majority noted, a case in point may already have occurred:
One detainee asked the CSRT to call his employer as a witness to
corroborate his claim that he had no affiliation with Al Qaeda. The CSRT
found that the employer was not reasonably available. Once the case went
before the court of appeals, however, and the detainee was assisted by
counsel for the first time, counsel reported that the employer was indeed
available.' 08 But by then it was too late: under DTA review, unlike habeas
review, the reviewing court cannot consider evidence not reasonably
available to the government at the CSRT stage.
The Chief Justice was on stronger ground in pointing out that the
majority had left future habeas procedures murky. It had replaced DTA
review "with a set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts
at some future date."' 10 9
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2292 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2273 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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The majority indeed left many questions to be answered by lower
courts on remand. For example, it "ma[de] no attempt to anticipate all of
the evidentiary and access-to-counsel issues that will arise" on remand." 0
In a sense this was understandable and even laudable: it reflects
traditional principles of judicial restraint, as well as Justice Kennedy's
instinctive caution. Unfortunately, as the Chief Justice points out, it will
mean further delay for the very detainees whose already long imprisonment
without a final judicial determination of their status so troubles the
majority. "'
Within months of the judgment in Boumediene, lower courts resolved,
in the first instance, many of the questions left open by the Supreme Court.
They decided that in habeas proceedings brought by prisoners at
Guantanamo, the government bears the burden of proof to justify detention
by a preponderance of the evidence; 12 they adopted the government's own
definition of "enemy combatant";".3 they required the government to
produce unclassified versions of its proof and to provide classified versions
to properly cleared attorneys for the prisoners and, where the government
declined to do so for reasons of national security, to produce the secret
evidence in camera to the court, which might then order its release or
require the government to forego reliance upon it; 114 they authorized the
prisoner to conduct broad discovery of the government's evidence and to
present his own evidence; 1 5 they required the government to disclose
exculpatory evidence,16 including in some cases evidence of coercion or
torture; 117 they allowed reliance on hearsay, subject to conditions of
110. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion).
111. Id. at 2282, 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. E.g., In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, No. 05-1509, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97434,
at * 103-04 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2008) [hereinafter "Guantanamo"].
113. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87133 (D.D.C. Oct. 27,
2008). Under the definition adopted, an "enemy combatant" is "an individual who was part
of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces." Id. at *7.
114. E.g., Guantanamo, supra note 112, at *98, *101-03.
115. Compare id. at 99-101, with the broader discovery allowed by Dhiab v. Bush, No.
05-1457, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93503, at *7-9 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter
"Dhiab"].
116. E.g., Guantanamo, supra note 112, at *98-99.
117. Dhiab, supra note 115, at *5-6 (Exculpatory evidence "includes any evidence of
abusive treatment, torture, mental incapacity, or physical incapacity which could affect the
credibility and/or reliability of evidence being offered.").
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necessity and reliability;1 1 8 they granted a rebuttable presumption of
authenticity to the government's evidence;11 9 where material issues of fact
could not be resolved on the papers, they conducted evidentiary hearings;'
20
they ordered the release (as of this writing) of seventeen Uighurs no longer
deemed to be enemy combatants, as well as of five of the six prisoners
involved in the Boumediene case; 122 and they authorized continued
detention of the sixth Boumediene prisoner as an "enemy combatant," even
though he was captured outside a traditional war zone, because he was
planning to take up arms against the U.S. and to facilitate the travel of
others to join the fight against the U.S. in Afghanistan.
123
All these rulings are, eventually, subject to appeal. They could well be
decided in the last instance by the Supreme Court. In that event, the Court's
ruling in Boumediene will have left the habeas battle at Guantanamo only
half won: whoever occupies the next vacancies on the Supreme Court may
determine the final outcome.
Alternatively, these issues could be left without Supreme Court
resolution, in the event that President-elect Barack Obama, as he has stated
he will, decides to close Guantanamo, thus potentially rendering the
questions moot.124
C. Why Did the Court Take the Case?
The Court initially declined to hear Boumediene: on April 2, 2007,
over dissents by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Souter, the Court denied the
petitions for certiorari. 125 In a joint statement on the denial, Justices
Kennedy and Stevens stated that "traditional rules governing our decision
of constitutional questions, and our practice of requiring the exhaustion of
available remedies as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over
applications for the writ of habeas corpus, make it appropriate to deny these
118. E.g., Guantanamo, supra note 112, at *105-06.
119. Compare id, at *104 ("rebuttable presumption of accuracy and authenticity") with
Dhiab, supra note 115, at *12 ("rebuttable presumption of authenticity, and only
authenticity").
120. Boumediene v. Bush, No. 04-1166, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94473, at *5-6 (D.D.C.
Nov. 20, 2008).
121. In re Guantanamo Bay Litigation, No. 05-1509, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79238, at
*8-9, *35 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2008). A government appeal is pending. Richey, supra note 57 at
2; Richey, supra note 58, at 25.
122. Boumediene, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94473, at *18-19, *21-22.
123. Id. at* 19-21.
124. E.g., William Glaberson, Post-Guantanamo: A New Detention Law?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2008, at A13, available at 2008 WLNR 21813454.
125. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478-79 (2007).
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petitions at this time. 126
Yet only two months later, on June 4, the Court surprised observers
by inviting the government to respond to the petition for rehearing of the
denial of certiorari.127 One month later, the Court on rehearing agreed to
take the case. 128 What happened to make at least One,129 and perhaps
both, 130 Justices Kennedy and Stevens reverse course in the space of two or
three months?
Because the dissenters chastised the majority for overriding prudential
doctrines of restraint and taking the case, 13 1 the question is not one of mere
historical curiosity. Moreover, the reasons that likely motivated the
majority to take the case-disturbing information about Guantanamo
detentions and CSRTs publicized in May and June of 2007-probably also
informed aspects of the eventual ruling on the merits.
This writer is of course not privy to what changed the mind of
Justices Kennedy or Stevens or both. But five days before the Court
surprisingly asked the government to respond to the petition for rehearing,
a prisoner at Guantanamo committed suicide. A Washington Post account
noted that this was the fourth suicide at the base and that there had been
more than forty suicide attempts. "Attorneys for detainees[,]" it reported,
"have talked emotionally about the desperation their clients feel and have
railed against what they consider worsening conditions .... 132 A New
York Times story added, "[s]everal of the detainees' lawyers have said in
recent months that the psychological condition of many of the detainees
was markedly deteriorating. They said that some of the detainees had
begun to feel that they would never emerge alive from
Guantanamo .... 133
One must wonder whether these reports prompted Justices Kennedy
and Stevens to decide that the detainees-as the majority opinion later
126. Id. at 1478 (citations omitted).
127. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 2930, 2390 (2007).
128. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078, 3078 (2007).
129. Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, Certiorari, available at
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/certiorari (last visited Dec. 17, 2008) ("Under long-
standing internal Court practice if four justices favor granting a petition for cert. it will be
granted.").
130. Justice Kennedy wrote and Justice Stevens joined the eventual majority opinion. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2239 (2008).
131. See id at 2280 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
132. Josh White, Death of Guantanamo Detainee is Apparent Suicide, Military Says,
WASH. POST, May 31, 2007, at A8, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/30/AR2007053002580_pf.html.
133. William Glaberson, Detainee Found Dead in Guantanamo Cell, N.Y. TIMES, May
31, 2007, at A15, available at 2007 WLNR 10147325.
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stressed-had waited too long for a definitive judicial ruling.
At least three reports about CSRTs and DTA reviews, also published
in May and June of 2007, may have undermined the Justices' willingness to
await the outcomes of those substitutes for habeas:
1. On May 23, 2007, the Washington Post ran an opinion column that
commented on the court of appeals hearings on the CSRTs. The
columnist wrote, "[d]etainees have the burden of proving they are
not enemy combatants-but have little practical ability to obtain
helpful evidence." The columnist quoted several critical statements
by Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg of the court of appeals, including,
"I don't see how there can be any meaningful review," and "[w]hat
you're describing is a complete, [] wholesale [] departure from any
kind of adversarial system.
134
2. On the same day the Court asked the government to respond to the
petition for rehearing in Boumediene, a military judge dismissed all
charges against a detainee at Guantanamo, because the CSRT had
determined only that he was an "enemy combatant," not whether he
was an "unlawful" enemy combatant.
135
3. Six days before the Court granted rehearing and certiorari, the
Washington Post reported on an affidavit filed by Stephen Abraham,
a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Reserve, who was also a lawyer
and had served on a CSRT. He described the CSRT process as
"fundamentally flawed." According to the Post, he said that the
evidence before CSRTs "lacked specificity"; that "exculpatory
information about the detainees was unavailable and possibly
withheld"; that the government's hearsay evidence was like a "game
of telephone"; that there was "considerable pressure from
commanders for officers serving on the tribunals to determine that
the detainees were enemy fighters"; and that what were "purported
to be specific statements of fact lacked even the most fundamental
earmarks of objectively credible evidence."
136
134. Ruth Marcus, Editorial, Guilty of Insufficient Overreaching, WASH. POST, May 23,
2007, at A21 (quoting J. Douglas Ginsburg), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/O5/22/AR2007052201074.html; see Bismullah v. Gates,
501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g denied, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc
denied, 514 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
135. See White, supra note 132.
136. Carol D. Leonnig & Josh White, An Ex-Member Calls Detainee Panels Unfair:
Lawyer Tells of Flawed 'Combatant' Rulings, WASH. POST, June 23, 2007, at A03 (citing
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If Justices Kennedy and Stevens read these reports, any confidence
they might have had in the CSRT and DTA alternative review must have
been shaken-enough, perhaps, for them to conclude that ordinary rules of
avoiding constitutional questions and exhausting alternative remedies no
longer justified their deferring habeas review. And, although the majority
opinion nowhere mentions these new reports, 137 one may wonder whether
they informed the majority's skepticism about the fairness of CSRT
proceedings and the adequacy of DTA judicial review.
CONCLUSION
The majority ruling in Boumediene is the latest victory in a battle half
won for meaningful judicial review of detentions of supposed "unlawful
enemy combatants" at Guantanamo. To date the Court has brought honor
where the Executive brought shame and the Congress disappointment.
Much more remains to be decided by the Supreme Court.' 38 Can persons
captured outside traditional battlefields (like Mr. Boumediene, who was
apprehended in Bosnia) be lawfully imprisoned without charge at
Guantanamo? How much evidence that a person is an "enemy combatant"
does the government need to produce to justify continued detention before
a habeas court? What access, if any, will the detainee or his lawyer have to
classified information, when that information is the basis for his detention?
Given the bare 5-4 majorities in Hamdan and Boumediene, and the
prospect of imminent departures of one or more members of the majority,
the final outcome may turn on who are the next nominees to the Court. Or
the matter might become moot before the cases return to the Supreme
Court-if President-elect Obama, as he has said he will, 139 takes the long
overdue step of closing Guantanamo, thus finally bringing to an end this
offense against our nation's commitment to the rule of law.
Stephen Abraham's sworn affidavit), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/22/AR200706220223O.html.
137. The Lieutenant Colonel's affidavit was made a part of the record before the Court
and brought to the Court's attention in the Al Odah Petitioner's Initial Brief. Brief of
Petitioner Al Odah at 4-5, Al Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (Aug. 24, 2007).
138. Following Boumediene, these and other questions have now been resolved in the
first instance by the district courts. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
139. E.g., Glaberson, supra note 124.
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